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Summary  findings
In  1989,  Indonesia's  Minister  for  Population  and  the  group  of plants  did make  efforts  to control  pollution
Environment  introduced  its "Clean  River"  Program,  emissions.  A further  and  important  contribution  of the
better  known  as PROKASIH.  The  program's  purpose  is  PROKASIH  program  has been  to  identify  the  plants
to improve  water  quality  by reducing  emissions  from  the  willing  to practice  pollution  control  and  those  unwilling
most  important  sources  of water  pollition  in Indonesia.  to do so. This  information  should  prove  useful  in the
Though  participation  in the prograin  is not  entirely  allocation  of  monitoring  resources.  A program-based
voluntary,  compliance  with  tne terms  of  the agreement  approach  targeted  at  a specific  subset  of polluters  can
signed  bv the  plants  is nor  legallv  binding,  and  to a large  increase  the incentives  for  pollution  control.
extent,  is voluntarv.  It is clear  from  this experiment  that  regulators  must
Both  total  biological  oxygen  demand  (BOD) discharges  establish  a system  for  pollution  control  that  analyzes
and  pollution  intensitv  (emissions  per  unit  of output)  environniental  performance  of plants  reliably.  Regulators
fronm  PROKASIH  plants  fell significantly;  during  the  must  confront  such  issues as self-reporting,  information,
period  analyzed  by Afsah,  Laplante,  and  Makarim.  But  ;nspections,  compliance  assessment,  and  others.  A
the performance  of plants  varied  widely  and the  general  program-based  approach  can  pave the way  to setting  in
improvemenit  in BOD  discharges  was achieved  through  place a reliable  compliance  management  svstem.  It can
the efforts  of a few  plants.  also  provide  the  foundations  of a river  basin
Despite  the absence  of  a reliable  regulatory  framework  environmental  management  svstem.
and credible  monitoring  and enforcement  capabilities,  a
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Bank's Research  Support  Budget under  the research  project  "The  Economics  of Industrial  Pollution  Control  in Developing
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The implementation  of  environmental objectives  is particularly  demanding for
environmental  regulators  of  developing countries.  Policy makers  may indeed  express
concerns about diverting resources to pollution control when poverty, illiteracy and infant
mortality are still major problems. Hence, most developing  countries typically do not
allocate  the resources  necessary to  establish comprehensive and  extensive  systems of
pollution  control.  This  may  explain  that  while  regulation  does  frequently  exist  in
developing countries, the monitoring of the regulated community and the enforcement of
environmental standards are often extremely weak. As a result, incentives to comply with
environmental standards and to control pollution emissions remain generally very small.
It does not follow however that environmental regulators of developing countries have no
options and should remain powerless in face of deteriorating environmental quality as a
result of excessive emissions of pollution.
Given the fast rate of industrialization and urbanization experienced by Indonesia,
the environmental  and health costs imposed by the increasing release of pollution  was
expected to grow rapidly despite the presence of environmental regulations both  at the
national and provincial levels. The fact is that the behavior of the regulated industries was
not closely monitored, and enforcement  of the environmental  standards was, for most
purposes, non-existent. The Ministry for  Population and the Environment had  limited
resources to monitor or regulate industrial pollution, and Governors of provinces had no
incentives to  do  so. Though  reliable  data is  not  available, it  is widely believed  that
industrial plants simply ignored (or were unaware of) the environmental regulation. As a
result, the Ministry decided  in  1989 to focus  its limited resources  on implementing a
program-based  approach  for  controlling  the  discharge  of  industrial  pollution  in
waterways. On June  19, 1989, the Ministry introduced its "Clean River" Program, better
known  as  PROKASIH.  Upon  its  establishment  in  1990, the  Environmental  Impact
Management Agency (BAPEDAL) chose to use the PROKASIH program to introduce
control of industrial pollution of Indonesia's  rivers and to begin implementation of the
Water  Pollution  Control Regulations  (PP20/1990), and  related Ministerial  Decree  on
Effluent Discharge (KEPMEN 03/199 1).
The purpose  of the  program is to  improve water  quality by seeking pollution
reduction  from  the  most  important  sources  of  water  pollution  in  Indonesia. Though
participation in  the program is not  voluntary per  se,  a particular characteristic  of the
agreement signed by the plant is that it is not legally binding. Hence, once the agreement
has been signed, compliance with the terms of the agreement is to  a very large extent
voluntary.
We show that  total BOD discharges from PROKASIH plants  fell significantly
over  the period  of  analysis. However, we  also  show  that  this  aggregate result hides
considerable differences in the performance of plants. In particular, the reduction in total
BOD  discharges  has  been  achieved  through  an  improvement  in  the  environmental
performance of a small number of plants. A plant's performance can be explained by both
ia change in its scale of activity and by a change in its level of emissions per unit of output
(pollution intensity). We thus also look at changes in pollution intensity by PROKASIH
plants. We show that pollution intensity changed significantly as a result of PROKASIH.
Our analysis of the PROKASIH experience suggests that there does exist a group
of plants that have exerted effort to control pollution emissions despite the absence of a
reliable regulatory  framework and credible monitoring  and  enforcement  capability. A
significant contribution of a program like PROKASIH is to delineate plants willing to
exert pollution  control  effort from  those less  inclined to  do  so. This  division should
provide useful information for BAPEDAL, and set the stage for further and more focused
intervention  if  needed.  Moreover,  the  desire  to  control  and  monitor  closely  the
environmental performance of a limited number of plants, confronts the regulator to the
need of setting and implementing a system by which performance is going to be measured
and  analyzed  reliably.  Hence,  another  significant  contribution  of  a  program  like
PROKASIH is that  it forces the regulator to confront issues of  implementation of the
objectives  of  the  program,  and  more  broadly,  of  the  objectives  of  environmental
regulations.  Issues  of  self-reporting, information,  inspections, compliance  assessment,
etc. must be dealt with.
ii1.  Introduction
Two issues in environmental economics have attracted most of  the attention and
research  effort: the control  of pollution  emissions  and the valuation  of the costs  and
benefits of reducing those emissions.'  With respect to the control of pollution emissions,
most  of  the  environmental  policy  debate  has  centered  around  the  comparison  of
command-and-control  (CAC)  and  economic  instruments  (emission  charges,  tradable
permits, subsidies). 2 Recent experiments with economic instruments have revealed that a
combination  of both  CAC and econornic instruments is  most  likely to be  efficient. 3It
remains the case however that  the design and implementation of  these approaches (or of
a  mix of them) is highly resource-intensive and impose  stringent requirements on the
regulator.
The  implementation  of environmental  objectives is  particularly demanding  for
environmental  regulators  of developing  countries.  Policy makers may  indeed express
concerns about diverting resources to pollution control when poverty, illiteracy and infant
mortality are still  major problems. Hence, most  developing countries  typically do not
I  Cropper and Oates (1992) provide a survey of each of these issues.
2  Bohm and Russell (1985) summarizes the relative advantages of each approach.
3  For example, economic instruments are not easily tailored to location-specific
environmental damages. In such circumstances, interventions of a CAC nature may
complement the use of economic instruments. See Hahn (1989), Hahn and Hester (1989)
and OECD (1989, 1991) for more details. Moreover, the use of an emission charge to
meet a given target requires information that is not readily available. Baumol and Oates
(1971) suggests a simple iterative process to achieve a given level of emissions reduction
in the absence of information on marginal abatement costs. However, this process ignores
that firms undertake significant investment when facing a given charge, and that this
investment may not be optimal once the charge is changed. There could therefore be large
costs associated with changing the tax rate. Moreover, the process proposed by Baumol
and Oates ignores that firms engage in strategic behavior vis-a-vis the regulator. The
welfare properties associated with this strategic interaction has been recently analyzed by
Karp and Livernois (1994).
1allocate  the resources  necessary to  establish  comprehensive and extensive  systems of
pollution  control.  This  may  explain  that  while  regulation  does  frequently  exist  in
developing countries, the monitoring of the regulated community and the enforcement of
environmental standards  are often extremely weak. 4 As a  result, incentives to  comply
with environmental standards and to control pollution  emissions remain generally very
small. 5
It does not follow however that environmental regulators of developing countries
have  no options  and  should remain  powerless  in  face of  deteriorating  environmental
quality  as a result of excessive emissions  of pollution.  On the basis of the Indonesian
experience, we argue in this paper that a program-based approach targeted at a specific
subset of polluters can increase the incentives for pollution control, and pave the way to
setting in place a reliable compliance management system.
Indonesia has  achieved remarkable economic success over  the last twenty-five
6 years: per capita income increased annually at a rate of 4.5% after 1970.  This success
4  It should  not be implied  that monitoring  and enforcement  issues  have been  solved  in the
United  States (and  more  generally  in developed  countries).  Russell  (1990)  writes:  "What
is missing  is a commitment  of resources  to checking  up on whether  those covered  by the
law and regulations  are doing  (or not doing)  what is required  of (or  forbidden  to) them."
(p. 243).  In a recent study,  the General  Accounting  Office  (1993)  concludes  that the EPA
cannot  ensure  the accuracy  of the pollution  data reported by polluters.  In Quebec,  while
59 pulp  and paper  plants were in operation  during  the period 1985-1990,  there has been  a
total of only  54 sampling  inspections  by the Ministry  of the Environment  (Laplante  and
Rilstone (1995)).
5  See O'Connor  (1994)  for more  details.
6  Per capita income  was US$50  in the late 1960s.  It is now estimated  to be US$650.
Poverty  fell  drastically  (from  70 million  individuals  to approximately  27 million);  life
expectancy  rose from 41 years in 1960  to 61 years in 1990;  primary  school  enrollment
nearly  tripled  and secondary  school  enrollment  increased  8-fold.
2was achieved through rapid industrialization: while manufacturing represented  13% of
GDP in the 1970s, it represented 23% of GDP in the 1980s.  This rapid development had
serious adverse impacts on the environment, especially in Java where 75% of the total
Indonesian industrial  activity is located. In particular, the quality of  surface water has
become  a  major  source  of  concern.8  Given  the  fast  rate  of  industrialization  and
urbanization, the environmental  and health  costs imposed by the increasing release  of
pollution was expected to grow rapidly despite the presence of environmental regulations
both at the national and provincial levels. The fact is that the behavior of the regulated
industries was not closely monitored,  and enforcement of the environmental  standards
was, for most purposes, non-existent. The Ministry for Population and the Environment
had  limited  resources  to  monitor  or  regulate  industrial  pollution,  and  Governors  of
provinces had no incentives to do so. Though reliable data is not available, it is widely
believed that industrial  plants simply ignored (or were unaware of) the environmental
regulation. As  a result, the Ministry decided  in  1989 to focus its limited resources on
implementing  a  program-based  approach  for  controlling  the  discharge  of  industrial
pollution  in waterways. On June  19, 1989, the Ministry introduced  its  "Clean  River"
Program,  better  known  as  PROKASIH.  Upon  its  establishment  in  1990,  the
Environmental Impact Management Agency (BAPEDAL) chose to use the PROKASIH
7  Total industrial  output  has increased  8-fold  since 1970.  This development  was
accompanied  with  a rapid  increase  of Indonesia's  urban  population  from 15%  to 30% of
total  population.  This  was particularly  true on the Island  of Java, which  accounts  for 60%
of the Indonesian  population  with  a population  density  that  is among  the highest  in the
world.  For more details  on Indonesia's  economic  development,  see World  Bank (1994).
Water  is estimated  to be an important  factor  of disease  in Indonesia  as most water sources
are considered  unsafe  to drink.  The benefits  of solely  reducing  the diarrhea-related
mortality  by 50% were  estimated  to be in the order of US$300  million  in 1990  (World
Bank, 1994).  This  number  ignores  the gains  from reducing  the effects  of water pollution
3program to introduce control of industrial pollution  of Indonesia's  rivers and to  begin
implementation  of the  Water Pollution  Control  Regulations  (PP20/1990),  and  related
Ministerial Decree on Effluent Discharge (KEPMEN 03/1991).9
The purpose  of the program is  to  improve water  quality by seeking pollution
reduction  from  the most  important  sources  of  water pollution  in  Indonesia. Though
participation in  the program is not  voluntary per  se, a  particular characteristic  of the
agreement signed by the plant is that it is not legally binding. Hence, once the agreement
has been signed, compliance with the terns  of the agreement is to a very large extent
voluntary.
Recent literature has pointed out the potential role of other policy tools to induce
greater pollution  control effort from industrial  units. In particular, programs  based on
"voluntary" participation and programs based on the provision of information to various
stakeholders  increasingly  attract  attention.1° There  is  some  evidence  from  the  US
experience  that  emissions  can  be  reduced  through  voluntary  programs.  Such  an
experience is the 33/50 Program, initiated by the US Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) to reduce releases of 17 toxic chemicals by 33% and 50% by the end of 1992 and
on morbidity. Air pollution and toxic wastes are also important issues. However, in this
paper  we focus solely on water pollution.
9  Because of its limited resources, BAPEDAL created a program called JAGATIRTA
whose purpose is to respond to complaints raised by local communities. The program is
therefore extremely focused, and a follow-up is made only on those complaints judged by
BAPEDAL to be significant.
On the role and impact of information provision programs, see Hamilton (1995),
Kennedy, Laplante and Maxwell (1994), Laplante (1995), Laplante and Lanoie (1994),
and Muoghalu et al. (1990).
41995 respectively (hence the name 33/50). Participation in the program is voluntary, and
commitments  to achieve reductions are not enforceable by law.  As of February  1992,
more than 700 plants had committed their participation."' Early evidence suggests that for
the period  1988-1992, toxic emissions  fell by  40%  (7 points  above the target). After
more than 20  years of  CAC, the  EPA claims  that  its  33/50  Program  is  an effective
alternative to traditional regulation.
The purpose of this paper is to identify the impact of PROKASIH on both total
discharges of  biological oxygen  demand (BOD)  as  well as on  the pollution  intensity
(pollution per unit of output) of participating plants. Looking at changes in BOD load is
justified  by  the  regulator's  concern  over  ambient  quality.  Indeed, ambient  quality  is
primarily affected by the total load of emissions discharged in receiving waters. Changes
in total discharges is therefore  of relevance to the regulator. We show that total  BOD
discharges  from  PROKASIH  plants 2fell  significantly  over  the  period  of  analysis.
However, we also show that this  aggregate result hides considerable differences in the
performance of plants.  In particular, the  reduction in  total  BOD  discharges  has been
achieved through an improvement in the environmental performance of a small number
of plants.
Arora and Cason (1995) analyze the characteristics of the plants participating in the 33/50
program. In particular, they show that large plants are most likely to participate.
12  We use the expression "PROKASIH plants"  to identify plants that  are participating in
the program.
5A plant's  performance can be explained by both a change in its scale of activity
and by a change in its level of emissions per unit of output. We thus also look at changes
in  pollution intensity  by  PROKASIH plants. We  show that  the pollution  intensity  of
PROKASIH plants fell significantly over the period of analysis. These results suggest that
environmental regulators of developing countries, despite a lack of resources, can proceed
forward to control pollution emissions and achieve significant results through a program-
based approach targeted at a specific subset of polluters.
In the  next  section, we  discuss  PROKASIH  in  more detail,  and  describe  the
dataset that has been used to perform the analysis. In Section 3, we analyze changes in
BOD  discharges by  PROKASIH  plants  while  in  Section  4,  we  examine  changes  in
pollution intensity. In Section 5, we discuss in more detail the role of a pollution control
program of the PROKASIH nature. We conclude in Section 6.
2.  The PROKASIH Program and the dataset
(a) The PROKASIH Program
The primary objective of PROKASIH is to prevent further decline in river quality.
The program is based on pollution reduction agreements co-signed by provincial Vice-
Governors, BAPEDAL, and participating plants. In 1989, 8 provinces were participating
in  the PROKASIH program. This  number increased  to  13 provinces in  1994.  13Vice-
Governors serve as local coordinators. In each province, an implementation team (called
13  Four  new provinces  became  PROKASIH  provinces  in 1995/96:  Bali, Sulawesi  Selatan,
Manado,  and Jambi.
6PROKASIH team)  has been constituted with representatives from  various institutions:
public  works,  regional  development planning  board  (BAPPEDA),  health  department,
laboratories,  environmental  study  centers,  etc.  Both  BAPEDAL  and  the  provincial
governments provide financial resources to the PROKASIH team. The responsibilities of
the PROKASIH team include the following:
*  Identification and selection of industrial units that are significant polluters;
*  Measurement of the quality of  polluters' effluents and water ambient quality;
*  Data collection and reporting to BAPEDAL
In order  to  achieve the objectives of PROKASIH, priority is  given to  specific
rivers, or portion of rivers where concerns over water quality are most  serious, and by
seeking pollution reductions from the largest polluters along the chosen rivers. It is the
responsibility  of the  provincial  PROKASIH  team  to  choose  both  the  rivers  and  the
polluters.  In  1994, 1405 establishments  were  participating in  PROKASIH.  Given  the
importance of  industrial  plants in  the  program (industrial  plants  account  for  90% of
participating establishments), we focus solely on these plants in this paper.
The  number  of  PROKASIH  plants  varies  considerably  across  provinces.  As
shown in Table  1, Jawa Barat and DKI Jakarta represent by far the largest number of
participating plants, with approximately 75% of the total  number in  1994. Jawa Barat
itself covers 56% of the total  number of plants, and exhibits  a substantial  increase in
7participation since 1990. Though both Jawa Barat and D.K.I. Jakarta appear to be very
active in terms of enrolling plants in the
Table 1: Number of PROKASIH Plants Per Province
Province  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994
Jawa  Barat  7 7  100  |  326  |  5S29  _  723  723
DKI Jaka_rta  96  |  193  T  220  T  228  228
Jawa Tengah  44  44  44  64  64
Jawa_Timur  39  T  45  T  45  T  45  45
Lamnpung  9  T_30  T  30  T  34  34
Sumatera Selatan  33  33  33  33  33
Kalimantan Timur  30  30  30  30  31
Sumatera Utara  30  30  30  30  30
Kalimantan Selatan  0  0  0  0  20
Riau  0  18  18  19  19
D.I. Aceh  0  14  14  14  17
D.I. Yogyakarta  0  0  0  0  16
Kalimantan Barat  0  15  15  15  15
TOTAL  381  778  1008  1235  1275
PROKASIH program, it is interesting to note that they are also the two provinces where
the budget of the PROKASIH team per plant is the smallest. As will be shown in the next
section, this may explain that none of the PROKASIH plants in Jawa Barat and D.K.I.
Jakarta  survive our  selection criteria for  inclusion in  our final  sample of  analysis. In
particular, plants in D.K.I. Jakarta and Jawa Barat report their emissions at a frequency
that is insufficient to estimate reliably their pollution profile. 14
(b) The dataset
Our dataset has been constructed in the following way. First, we identified plants
that became PROKASIH plants in 1990, and for which there is at least one measurement
per year, for each of the years covering the period  1990-94.  A similar exercise  was
performed for the plants that became PROKASIH plants in 1991. Second, we develop a
14  Appendix  I describes  the process  by which  BAPEDAL  collects  information  from
PROKASIH  plants.
8strict set of guidelines  that allowed  us to identify  and reject  observations  that could not be
technically  explained. 15 As described  in Table 2,  the final dataset for the period 1990-94
covers 100  plants located  in 6 provinces  along 24 rivers, and for which a total of 2819
observations  are available (this represents  an average of 5.6 observations  per plant per
year over the time period); the 1991-94  dataset covers 55 plants located in 5 provinces
along 10 rivers, and for which 937 observations  are available (for an average of 4.5
observations  per plant per year).
The number  of plants in our dataset (100 and 55) may appear  small relative  to the
total number of PROKASIH  plants participating  in the program in 1990 and 1991 (381
and 778 respectively)  . However,  as noted above, observe in Table 2 that none of the
plants in D.K.I. Jakarta and Jawa Barat are included in our dataset since the data from
those provinces  is too sparse and unreliable. If one excludes PROKASIH  plants from
those two provinces, the  total  number of  PROKASIH plants in  the remaining 11
provinces  in 1990  is 185  (Table 1). Our 1990-94  dataset  therefore  covers more than 50%
of the participating  plants. Similarly,  excluding  D.K.I. Jakarta and Jawa Barat, 74 plants
became PROKASIH  plants in 1991. Our 1991-94  dataset therefore  covers approximately
75% of those plants.  The coverage  of our dataset  per province  is described  in Table  3.
15  Thlese  guidelines  are available  upon request.
9Table 2: Description of Datasets
Period  of analysis
Provinces  Rivers  1990-94  1991-94
Number  of  Number  of  Number  of  |  Number  of
new plants  observations  new plants  |  observations
Jawa Tengah  Anyar  2  46  |
Jawa Tengah  Bengawan Solo  2  46
Jawa Tengah  Kaligarang  2  44
Jawa Tengah  Ngringo  6  134
Jawa Tengah  Palur  1  21
Jawa Tengah  Pengo  4  92
Jawa Tengah  Pepe  1  23
Jawa Tengah  Premulung  1  25
Jawa Tengah  Sroyo  4  89
Jawa Timur  Kali Brantas  14  612
Jawa Timur  Kali Lesti  3  132
Jawa Timur  Kali Porong  2  100
Jawa  Timur  Kali  Surabaya  10  518
Jawa Timur  Kanal Mangetan  1  51  --  --
Jawa Timur  Kali Mediun  --  --  6  140
Kalimantan Timur  Mahakan  8  147  --  --
Lampung  Way Pangubuan  4  80
Lampung  Way Seputih  1  20  --  --
Lampung  Way Pegadungan  --  --  5  50
Lampung  Way Sekampung  --  |  6  81
Lampung  Way Terusan  --  2  24
Lampung  Way Tul. Bawang  --  --  5  59
Sumatera Selatan  Kramasan  I  15  --  --
Sumatera Selatan  Musi  16  257
Sumatera Selatan  Ogan  2  33
Sumatera Utara  Asahan  5  129
Sumatera Utara  Deli  6  143
Sumatera Utara  Merbau  2  54
Sumatera Utara  Semayang  2  52  --  --
D.I. Aceh  Langsa  --  --  3  37
D.I.Aceh  Tamiang  3  39
Kalimantan Barat  Kapuas  5  119
Kalimantan Barat  Kapuas Kecil  5  119
Riau  Siak  15  269
10Table 3: Coverage of Datasets per Province
1990-  1994  _  1991 - 1994
Number of  Number of  Number of  Number of
Prokasih  Prokasih  %  new  Prokasih  %
PROVINCE  plants in  plants in  coverage  Prokasih  plants in  coverage
1990  dataset  plants in  dataset  of new
- 1991  plants
Jawa Barat  100  0  0  226  0  0
DKI Jakarta  96  0  0  97  0  0
Jawa Tengah  44  23  52.3  0  0
Jawa Timur  39  30  77.0  6  6  100
Lampung  9  5  55.5  21  18  85.7
Sumatera Selatan  33  19  57.5  0  0  -
Kalimantan Timur  30  8  26.6  0  0  -
Sumatera Utara  30  15  50.0  0  0  -
Kalimantan Selatan  0  0  - 0  0  -
Riau  0  0  18  15  83.3
D.I. Aceh  0  0  - 14  6  42.8
D.I. Yogyakarta  0  0  0  0  -
Kalimantan Barat  0  0  - 15  10  66.6
Both  datasets will be  used to  assess  the overall trend in  pollution  load and pollution
intensity of industrial sources participating in the PROKASIH program.
In  the  next  section,  we  examine  the  aggregate  changes  in  BOD  load  by
PROKASIH plants for each of the rivers along which PROKASIH plants are located. In
Section  4,  we  disaggregate  this  result  to  examine  the response  of  individual  plants
following their participation in PROKASIH.
113.  Changes in aggregate BOD load
In this section, our interest is to analyze the trend in aggregate BOD load by PROKASIH
plants. For this purpose, let Ci, be a measure of BOD concentration of plant i's  effluent in year t,
and C,, be the average BOD concentration of  plant i's  effluent in year t. Similarly, let Fit  be a
measure of  flow rate by plant i in year t, and Pit  be the average daily flow rate for plant i in year
t. Let BODit  be the BOD load of plant i in year t measured in kg/day. Then, BODit is given by: 20
BOD=  Ct  FD
1000
Finally, let N1 be the number of PROKASIH plants discharging in river j. Let BODjt be the total
BOD load by PROKASIH plants, in river j in year t, measured in kg/day. Then, BODjt is simply:
BODJ, =  IBOD,r
i=l
We examine the evolution of the variable BODj, for both the 1990-94 and 1991-94 dataset, along
each of the PROKASIH river. Results are presented in Table 4 and Table 5 for each of the dataset,
and then grouped into three categories in Figure 1, 2  and 3 according to whether aggregate BOD
discharges increase, decrease or are uncertain along each of the river. As can be observed, the
evolution of  total BOD load is of a similar nature for both datasets: there are strong indications that
total BOD discharges from PROKASIH plants have been significantly reduced in  18 of the 34
rivers in our dataset. However, in 9 rivers, BOD discharges by PROKASIH plants have reached
higher levels in 1994 than in 1990 or 1991. In the aggregate, total BOD discharges fell significantly
20  (mg  / liter)  *(cubic  meter  / day)  = (mg  / liter) * (1000  liters  / day)  = kg / day.
12Table 4: Percentage Ch  ange of BOD Load by River (1990-94)
Province  River  1990  % change  % change
kg/day  1990-91  |  1990-94
Jawa Tengah  Anyar  70  62  141
Jawa Tengah  Bengawan Solo  1519  -80  29
Jawa Tengah  Kaligarang  14  79  277
Jawa Tengah  Ngringo  1542  21  -57
Jawa Tengah  Palur  52  -9  1
Jawa Tengah  Pengo  436  -27  11
Jawa Tengah  Pepe  89  -58  -65
Jawa Tengah  Premulung  826  31  65
Jawa Tengah  Sroyo  255  143  -73
Jawa Timur  Kali Brantas  5842  -32  -3
Jawa Timur  Kali Lesti  8624  -49  -59
Jawa Timur  Kali Porong  3771  346  51
Jawa Timur  Kali Surabaya  10913  -8  -18
Jawa Timur  Kanal Mangetan  8575  26  -63
Kalimantan Timur  Mahakan  400  -18  -7
Lampung  Way Pangubuan  2784  -39  -59
Lampung  Way Seputih  709  -16  -94
Sumatera Selatan  Kramasan  1599  -66  -58
Sumatera Selatan  Musi  10406  -44  -53
Sumatera Selatan  Ogan  2391  -52  -35
Sumatera Utara  Asahan  3022  -38  -71
Sumatera Utara  Deli  405  -48  -49
Sumatera Utara  Merbau  586  56  -62
Sumatera Utara  Semayang  247  -5  -80
over the period of analysis. In Table 4, while aggregate BOD discharges by the 100 plants were 65
077 kg/day in 1990, these discharges fell to 41 846 kg/day in 1994, a decline of 36.25%; in Table
5, total discharges fell from 106 147 kg/day in 1991 to 59 489 in 1994, a reduction of 44%.
That such reductions were achieved by PROKASIH plants is certainly of clear interest to
BAPEDAL. However, of potentially more significance for BAPEDAL, there is a clear indication,
in Figure 1, that BOD load is on an upward trend in 1993 and 1994. Though additional data will
13Table  5: Percentage  C  ange  of BOD Loaby  River  (1991
Province  River  1991  % change  % change
_  kg/day  1991-92  1991-94
Jawa Timur  Kali Mediun  743  -10  -41
Lampung  Way Pegadungan  22670  -59  -98
Lampung  Way Sekampung  3463  85  473
Lampung  Way Terusan  717  166  124
Lampung  Way Tul. Bawang  18627  -28  -61
D.I. Aceh  Langsa  729  -34  -47
D.I.Aceh  Tamiang  4993  -90  -87
Kalimantan Barat  Kapuas  2594  153  306
Kalimantan Barat  Kapuas Kecil  9024  -83  -48
Riau  Siak  42587  -67  -68
reveal whether or not this trend persists, it is worth pointing out that a number of factors may
explain this development. First, it should be noted that total BOD discharges increase, ceteris
paribus, with actual production. The important economic growth rate currently experienced by
Indonesia may therefore explain this  increase in BOD discharges. It is important to  note that
these increases could take place despite greater pollution control efforts by PROKASIH plants.
This is  why we examine, in  the next section,  BOD  emissions per  unit of  output (pollution
intensity), instead of total BOD discharges. Second, for some rivers, the number of participating
plants in our dataset is small. Finally, this upward trend could also indicate that there may be a
limit to the ability of a program of the nature of PROKASIH (in which agreements to reduce
emissions are not legally binding) to induce persistent pollution control efforts on the part of the
firms. This may be particularly the case in a situation where industrial growth is rapid, and where
the enforcement of the environmental regulation has traditionally been, and to  a large extent
remains,  lacking. 2 '
21  As mentioned earlier, currently most enforcement actions are undertaken through JAGATIRTA following
complaints of local communities. The number of such actions is very limited.
14Figure 1: PROKASIH Rivers Where Average  BOD Load per Day Declined
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15Figure 2: PROKASIH Rivers Where Average  BOD Load per day Increased
1990.94  and 1991-94 (Kilogram  of BOD  per day)
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Figure 3: PROKASIH Rivers Where BOD  Load per day Trend is Uncertain
1990-94/1991-94  (Kilogram  of BOD  per day)
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16In the  next section,  we  analyze the data  at the  plant  level,, and  seek  to  identify  the
individual contribution of the plant to the overall BOD reduction  measured above. 22 We also
examine changes in  pollution  intensity  and  suggest, through  counterfactual analysis, that  the
impact of PROKASIH may be larger than measured above.
4.  Changes in BOD load and pollution intensity at the plant level
In this section, we analyze the pattern of plant-level responses, using pooled data across
rivers from the  1990-94 dataset. 23 First, we examine changes in BOD load, and then analyze
changes in pollution intensity.
(a) BOD load
Before looking in  the details  of the plant-level responses, it is interesting to rank  the
PROKASIH plants in terms of their individual contribution to total BOD discharges. In order to
do so, we have computed  an index that is similar in nature to the Lorenz curve developed in
24 industrial organization.  Let BOD 90 be the total BOD load, in  1990, by the 100 plants of the
1990-94 dataset:
22  It should  be noted at this  point that  no attempt  is made  in this  paper to obtain  a measure  of the
relationship  between  ambient  concentration  at any given  point  along the rivers and BOD  discharges  of
individual  plants;  nor  is an attempt  made  at measuring  in  dollars  the impact  of BOD discharges  in any
given  river  by any given  plant. If the PROKASIH  plants in our dataset  were the only sources  of BOD
discharges,  this  exercise  could be performed,  albeit  obtaining  a dollar  measure  of marginal  damages
would  still be problematic.  However,  (1)  we have eliminated  a significant  number  of PROKASIH  plants
due  to a lack of data; (2) PROKASIH  plants  are not the only  industrial  sources  of BOD  discharges  along a
river; and (3) one must also  account  for non-industrial  sources  of BOD  discharges.  These are the object
of ongoing  research.
23  For the purpose  of this section,  we are solely  using the 1990-94  dataset  since  it offers  a longer  period
of observations.  This is particularly  important  for the analysis  of pollution  intensity  since  we have  output
data up only  to 1993.  The 1991-94  dataset  would  thus offer only  3 years  of observation.
24  The Lorenz  curve shows  the percentage  of total industry  sales  accounted  for by any given  fraction  of the
firns of the industry,  with  the firms  ranked  in decreasing  order  of market  share.
17ZQ
BOD9  =  ,BODj,.
i=,
Then  rank  the  plants  such  that  BOD 190 > BOD2 >  > BOD,w.  The  curve  in  Figure  4
represents the ratio IBOD  / BODg  accounted for by the fraction n /  100 of the largest plants
i=1
in the dataset. When computed for the entire dataset (n = 100), the ratio is equal to 1.  In Figure
4, the x-axis  represents the cumulative  proportion of  plants, while the y-axis represents the
cumulative proportion of total BOD accounted for by these plants. If each plant were contributing
equally to aggregate discharges (BOD 190 = BOD290 =  ... = BOD,oo 9o), the computation of the ratio
described above would yield a straight line diagonal in Figure 4. The black curve indicates very
clearly however that this contribution is far from being uniform: 50% of total BOD discharges is
accounted for by less than 10% of the plants; 20% of the plants accounts for approximately 75%
of total BOD discharges in 1990. Without  any doubt, this suggests that most of PROKASIH's
impact on total BOD discharges crucially depends on the behavior of a relatively small number
of  plants.  A  large  reduction  in  BOD  discharges  by  the  largest  10% of  the  plants  would
significantly reduce pollution emissions. On the other hand, if 50% of the plants at the bottom
end of the distribution were abating their emissions from current levels to zero, total discharges
would fell by less than 5%.
There  are  various  ways by  which  one  can  analyze  the  contribution  of  each
individual plant to changes in total BOD load during the period of observation, and identify the
extent to which these changes are driven by the behavior of a relatively small number of plants.
In order to account for the large variation in the BOD discharges across plants, an interesting way
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to analyze the contribution of individual plant to changes in total BOD load is to express the
change in total BOD discharge between 1990 and any given subsequent year t (%ABODt),  as a
weighted sum ofthe changes by each individual plant  (%ABODit), with  the weight being the
plant's  contribution to total BOD discharge in  1990 (si). The percentage change in total BOD
discharges between 1990 and any subsequent year t is given by:
%ABODt = BODt - BOD9
-A  D  =  BOD90
After some manipulation, this can be rewritten as:
19[BOD, -BODi  BODj1
'L  BOD,9O  BOD9  j
which becomes:
% ABODt  =  Xs*  %  ABOD t
Hence a large variation in the BOD load of a plant which accounts for only a small portion of
total BOD discharges will have only a small effect on total BOD load. Conversely, large changes
from plants accounting for a large share of total BOD load in 1990 will have a significant impact
on the total  measure. To illustrate, we have arranged the contribution of individual plants in
descending order, from the largest positive contribution to changes in total BOD discharges (i.e.
firms increasing their BOD load) to the largest negative contribution (firms decreasing their BOD
load).25  Results appear in Figure 5.
From  the figure,  it appears clearly that  many plants  did  not  meet the  terms  of their
pollution reduction agreements. Indeed, over the period 1990-91 and 1990-94, approximately 10
plants  increased their BOD load significantly. The figure also  suggests an extremely skewed
distribution of plant contributions to total changes in BOD discharges. In particular, the bulk of
the reduction in BOD load is explained by less than 20 plants. Most strikingly, more than 65% of
the plants had a negligible impact on the change in BOD load.
25  In other  words,  we  have  ranked  the plants so that si %ABOD,t > s2%ABOD2t>  000  >SN%ABODNt.  It shall
be understood  that  the plant with  the largest  positive  contribution  is not necessarily  the plant that  has increased  the
most its BOD discharges  since  our index accounts  for the plant's share  in total  BOD discharges  in 1990.
20Figure 5: Change in BOD Load Contribution-Share by Plant
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As a result of these changes, the distribution of BOD load across the 100 plants of our
dataset changes significantly from 1990 to 1994. This is illustrated in Figure 6 where the dotted
line represents plants'  share of total BOD load in 1990, ranked from the plant with the largest share
(in 1990) to the plant with the smallest share. 26
In 1990, the plant with the largest share explained approximately 13% of the total
BOD load of the plants in our dataset; this same plant explains 7.5% of total BOD load in 1994.
In general, observe that the "pollution share" of individual plants fell significantly between 1990
and 1994. However, some plants exhibit a very sharp increase. For example, plant number 9 went
26  For the purpose  of clarity,  we have  truncated  the figure  at n = 64. The individual  share  of the plants not
represented  in Figure  6 is close  to zero  in both 1990  and 1994.
21Figure 6: BOD Load Share Trend by Plant
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from 3% of BOD share in 1990 to almost 11% in  1994. Such plants would obviously be prime
targets for further intervention if so desired.
We have noted in Section 3 that BOD load by PROKASIH plants fell significantly from
1990 to  1994. The current results however strongly indicate that the overall reduction in BOD
discharges is actually driven by a small number of plants in the dataset. Indeed, some plants have
increased their discharges and a large proportion of the plants did not have any significant impact
on BOD load (either because  of their  small size or because  indeed their BOD  load has  not
changed). Hence, though one may claim that PROKASIH has been successful at reducing total
BOD load in the PROKASIH rivers, a closer examination  reveals that the plants'  response to
PROKASIH varies considerably across plants.
22Thus far, we have simply compared the BOD  discharges in  1990 to the discharges in
subsequent years. Since the regulator is primarily concerned with ambient quality of the receiving
waters, changes in BOD load is clearly of relevance. Such a comparison ignores however that
were it not for the program, BOD discharges could have been much higher than those observed.
Indeed, total BOD discharges are a function of  both the plant's  scale of activity (ceteris paribus,
the higher the level of output, the higher the level of discharges), and the BOD intensity (BOD
load /  total  output).  Changes in  total BOD  discharges  will reflect changes in  both  of these
parameters. Therefore,  an  important  indicator  of  the impact  of  PROKASIH  is  changes in
pollution  intensity: constant BOD  discharge from a rapidly-growing plant (which can happen
only if pollution intensity falls) is clearly a sign of environmental progress.
(b) Changes in pollution intensity
In this section, we  first want to examine changes in pollution intensity, and on the basis of
these changes, provide a counterfactual analysis indicating that the impact of PROKASIH on BOD
discharges may be  larger than measured above. In order to perform this exercise, we must first
identify plants for which production data is available and then calculate pollution intensity for each
of the years of interest. As noted before, for the purpose of this analysis we are forced to use 1993
as the end year instead of 1994 since we have access to production data only up to 1993. From our
1990-94 dataset, we are  able to identify 73 plants in the Statistical data base for which production
data is available. For each of those plants we have calculated pollution intensity for each of the year
over the period 1990-93, and then normalized the median 1990 pollution intensity to  100. Results
are depicted in Figure 7, and are stunning. Despite the increase from 1992 to 1993, the median
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BOD intensity fell by approximately  55% between  1990 and  1993. This is by all means very
significant. It strongly suggests that considerable pollution control effort can be generated from a
subset of plants even in circumstances where resources devoted to monitoring and enforcement
activities are lacking.
That  PROKASIH had an impact on pollution  intensity can be  supported, to  a certain
extent,  by  looking  at plants'  investment  in  primary and  secondary effluent  treatments  after
PROKASIH was launched in June of 1989. In Figure 8, it appears clearly that installations of
wastewater treatment systems increased significantly since 1989. The lack of data does not allow
us to link unambiguously this activity to the introduction of PROKASIH. However, such activity
is consistent with what we have observed in terms of reduction of pollution load and pollution
intensity over the period 1990-94.
24Figure  8: Installation  of New Waste  Water  Treatment  System
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The  change  in  pollution  intensity,  as  observed  above,  suggests  that  we  may  have
underestimated the impact of PROKASIH on total BOD discharges. Indeed, let us assume that
without  PROKASIH,  pollution  intensity  in  1993  would  have  been  the  pollution  intensity
observed in 1990. Then it is easy to show the extent by which we have thus far under-estimated
the impact of PROKASIH. This is illustrated in Figure 9. In the figure, the curve labeled BODo
(or BODI) represents every combination of intensity and output that yield a BOD load equal to
BODo (or BODI). Note that BOD,  > BODo. Let us suppose a plant in  1990 with  a pollution
intensity Io and an output Qo thus yielding a BOD load equals
25Figure  9: Counterfactual  Analysis
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to BODo. This is represented by the surface OIoAQo.  Let us suppose that this same plant increases
its output to Q, in 1993 while decreasing its pollution intensity to II, yielding a pollution intensity
equal to BOD1. This is represented by the area 0IIBQ1. If we simply compare BOD 1 to BODO,
we  would conclude, as we did  in the previous  section, that BOD load  increased despite the
presence of PROKASIH. However, if we take into account that the impact of PROKASIH on
pollution  intensity,  then this  conclusion is  wrong. Indeed, if pollution  intensity in  1993 had
remained at the  1990 level, that  is Io, then  given the output level Ql,  this  plant would have
produced  a  total  amount  of  BOD  represented  by  the  area  OIoCQ 1. Hence,  the  impact  of
PROKASIH is  actually to reduce BOD load by the shaded area IIIOCB.  In other words, though
we may observe an increase in BOD load in 1993 (from BODo to BODI), without PROKASIH
26actual BOD discharges would have been even higher than BODI. The impact of PROKASIH can
therefore be measured by the difference between "what would have been", and "what is".
It is possible to obtain an estimate of the amount by which we underestimate the impact
of PROKASIH by looking solely at those plants that have shown a decrease in pollution intensity
between 1990 and 1993.27  Of those 73 plants, 40 exhibited a reduction in pollution intensity, and
33 an increase. If we simply calculate the BOD load in  1990 and  1993 for those 40 plants, we
observe a reduction of 21 596 kg per day. However, assuming that these plants would not have
exhibited a decrease in  pollution intensity, this  reduction  becomes  65 687 kg per  day. This
therefore indicates that we underestimate the impact of PROKASIH by a considerable margin.
Though this is obviously a gross estimate of what may really be the impact of PROKASIH, the
purpose of the exercise performed above is to indicate that the simple comparison of BOD load
in any two given years is likely to yield a distorted image of that impact.
5.  Discussion
Our analysis of the PROKASIH experience  suggests that  there does exist a  group of
plants that have exerted effort to control pollution emissions despite the absence of a reliable
regulatory  framework  and  credible  monitoring  and  enforcement  capability.  However,  our
analysis  also  shows  that  there  also  exists  plants  which  despite  their  participation  into
27  For the plants whose  pollution  intensity  has increased  in 1993,  it becomes  hazardous  to calculate  the
extent  of the under-estimation.  Indeed,  if the impact  of PROKASIH  is to  reduce pollution  intensity,  then
we  can only  conclude  that  in those  circumstances,  the  intensity  would  have  been  even  higher  than  the
one  observed.  However,  it would  be difficult  to identify  what  would  have  been  that  pollution  intensity.  We
therefore  prefer  simply  to ignore  these  situations  and  work  solely  with  the  plants  that  have  shown  a
decrease  in pollution  intensity.
27PROKASIH,  have typically not exerted such effort. One could therefore conclude that pollution
control programs of the nature of PROKASIH can only have a limited impact on the emissions of
pollutants,  and  on  environmental  quality.  Though  our  analysis may  indeed  support  such  a
conclusion, it does not follow that such programs have no role to play.
First, without PROKASIH, it is likely that few or none of the plants would have reduced
their  BOD  load  and/or  intensity.  Moreover,  a  significant  contribution  of  a  program  like
PROKASIH is to delineate plants willing to exert pollution control effort from those less inclined
to do so. This division should provide useful information for BAPEDAL, and set the stage for
further and more focused intervention if needed. Finally, the desire to control and monitor closely
the environmental performance of a limited number of plants, confronts the regulator to the need
of  setting  and  implementing  a  system by  which  performance is  going  to  be  measured  and
analyzed reliably. It forces the regulator to confront issues of implementation of the objectives of
the program, and more broadly, of the objectives of environmental regulations.  Issues of self-
reporting,  information,  inspections, compliance  assessment,  etc.  must  be  dealt  with.  Such  a
compliance system is lacking in most developing countries, and to a large extent, is still lacking
in Indonesia.
PROKASIH has now reached a point in its development where a certain number of issues
have to be  dealt with,  whether BAPEDAL  wishes to  focus its  effort on current  PROKASIH
plants or to expand the number of participating plants. Important issues include, among others,
the reliability of  the data collected  by  the PROKASIH teams  in  each  of the  provinces; the
28possibility  for  these teams  and  BAPEDAL to  process  and  analyze the information;  and  the
monitoring capability  of PROKASIH teams.  It is  important to  point out  once again that  the
analysis performed  above relies  heavily  on  information  provided by  provincial  PROKASIH
teams to BAPEDAL.  Though it is possible,  as we have done  so, to evaluate the quality  and
reliability of the data reported, the frequency at which PROKASIH teams collect information
about the pollution content of the polluters'  effluents remains very low. It shall be remembered
that out of the 778 plants that have joined the program in  1990 and  1991, only  155 provided
sufficient reliable data on which to base our analysis. There is clearly an important work to be
done to improve plants'  self-reporting as well as PROKASIH teams' data collection system. This
is particularly a source of concerns given the possibility of mistakes in the sampling and analysis
of  the plant's  effluent.  Similar  mistakes can obviously  be  performed  by  PROKASIH teams
themselves  when  sampling  a  plant's  effluents.  Finally,  given  the  limited  monitoring  and
enforcement  capacities  of BAPEDAL,  the  expected costs  of  under-reporting  true  emissions
levels, or simply avoiding self-reporting may be small.
BAPEDAL  must  face  these  issues  to  preserve  and  augment  the  integrity  of  its
PROKASIH program. Plants participating in PROKASIH must be expected to submit measures
of  the  quality  of  their  effluents  at  regular  and  frequent  intervals;  these  measures  must  be
performed according to a given set of rules to minimize the possibility of sampling errors; the
way in which these measures are reported to PROKASIH teams must be standardized so as to
minimize the costs of information processing;  and PROKASIH teams must have the resources
necessary to  perform sufficient  sampling and  analysis to  validate the plants'  self-reports. To
29summarize,  a  compliance  management  system  must  be  set  to  collect  data  from  the  plants
participating in PROKASIH, and to process, analyze and validate the data thus collected. This
must  be  done  without  significantly  increasing  the  costs  for  plants  which  participate  in
PROKASIH. The reliability of such a management system is crucial to establish PROKASIH's
credibility and to  allow PROKASIH to  achieve fully its role and  impact. PROKASIH forces
BAPEDAL to confront those issues. Once this framework is in place, BAPEDAL will be in a
position to expand its program to other plants. It will also be in position to use a broader mix of
instruments aimed at controlling industrial pollution, such as pollution charges.
BAPEDAL  has  recently  adopted  a  program  known  as  PROPER  PROKASIH.  The
purpose of this program is to announce publicly the environmental performance of plants, and in
particular to indicate, through a color scheme, how the plant deviates from the environmental
standards defined in KEPO3/MENKLH/11/1991.  The program was introduced partly as a response
to the trend observed in the 1993 and 1994 total discharges of PROKASIH plants. The viability
and  reliability  of  this  program crucially  depends  on  BAPEDAL's  ability  to  set  in  place  a
comprehensive compliance management system.
6.  Conclusion
In this paper, we have analyzed the impact of Indonesia's  PROKASIH program on BOD
discharges. We have shown that total BOD discharges from these plants have significantly been
reduced since the introduction of PROKASIH.  We have also shown  that if  it were  not  for
PROKASIH, total BOD discharges would most likely have been considerably higher than the
30levels observed in 1990. However, we have also shown that this overall performance is the result
of a very heterogeneous response by a small number of individual plants. Indeed, less than 25%
of the plants accounted for the observed reduction in total BOD load; most of the plants did not
have any significant impact on overall reduction of BOD discharges.
The Indonesian experience suggests that a program like PROKASlH can be a feasible and
cost-effective strategy in the initial stages of the development of a comprehensive framework of
public  intervention to  improve environmental  quality.  They can  lead to  significant pollution
reduction  within a relatively  short period of time,  and at the same time  set  into motion the
development of a compliance management system that is necessary to implement any program
aimed at reducing industrial discharges to improve environmental quality.
A  correct  measure  of  the  full  impact  of  PROKASIH  remains  to  be  developed.  In
particular, as pointed out above, a large number of plants have failed to report their emissions.
This  needs  to  be  improved.  Moreover,  though  the ultimate  objective  of  PROKASIH  is  to
improve  the  ambient  quality  of  important  rivers  in  Indonesia  (or  to  prevent  their  further
deterioration), we are unable at this point in time to link changes in emissions by PROKASIH
plants to changes in environmental quality. The location of PROKASIH and non-PROKASlH
plants along every PROKASlH river is known. However, data on discharges of non-PROKASlH
plants  as  well  as  of  non-industrial  facilities  is  clearly  insufficient  to  isolate  the  impact  of
discharges by PROKASIH plants. The location of monitoring stations would also  have to be
modified for this impact to be accounted for. However, given the objective of PROKASIH, its
31long-term sustainability may very well depend on its ability to demonstrate that ambient quality
is improving as a result of the program. Finally, we have not analyzed the characteristics of the
plants that have participated in the program (vs. not participated), and of those that have reduced
their BOD load (vs. increased). These issues remain the object of on-going research.
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Table 1: Budget of Prokasih Team  (rnillions of Rupiah)
Province  1990/91  199192  1992/93  1993/94  1994/95
Reo3na]  Natio  ToU  Regoonal Natona  Tota  RegionW Nabonal  Total  Regiona  Nationl  Total  Regional Natonal  TotU
D.I. Aceh  --  --  45.0  45.0  43.0  48.4  91.4  50.5  50.2  100.7  42.0  40.5  82.5
Sumatera Utara  80.0  80.0  90.0  90.0  82.0  58.0  140.0  80.0  52.8  132.8  80.0  27.5  107.5
Riau  --  --  55.0  =  55.0  38.2  47.8  86.0  49.5  40.0  89.5  52.8  38.2  91.0
Sumatera  Selatan  =-  --  25.0  25.0  100.0  =  100.0  93.0  47.0  140.0  96.0  39.0  135.0
Lampung  50.0  50.0  60.0  60.0  40.0  40.0  90.0  87.0  177.0  102.0  72.5  174.5
D.K.I. Jakarta  265.0  265.0  150.0  150.0  250.0  250.0  250.0  --  250.0  350.0  25.0  375.0
Jawa Barat  175.0  175.0  375.0  375.0  280.0  280.0  350.0  350.0  300.0  32.0  332.0
Jawa Tengah  65.0  =  65.0  80.0  =  80.0  98.0  =  98.0  130.0  =  130.0  110.0  33.0  143.0
D.I.  Yogyakarta  --  --  --  --  90.0  90.0  120.0  120.0  155.0  34.0  189.0
Jawa Timur  755.8  755.8  280.2  280.2  200.0  --  200.0  250.0  20.0  270.0  250.0  35.0  285.0
Kalimantan  Barat  --  --  150.0  =  150.0  75.0  40.0  115.0  50.0  40.0  90.0  85.0  30.0  115.0
Kalimantan  Selatan  --  --  --  --  --  --  --  --  --  --  40.0  46.0  86.0
Kalimantan Timur  25.0  =  25.0  45.0  =  45.0  50.0  45.0  95.0  50.0  45.0  95.0  100.0  36.0  136.0
1 Started  participation  in PROKASIH  in 91/92.
2 Started  participation  in PROKASIH  in 94/95.  However,  the province  had established  a PROKASIH  team  in 92/93.
3 In Jawa Timur,  the industrial  sector  must finance  the analysis  of the samples  collected  by the PROKASIH  team.  The budget  devoted  by the industrial  sector  for
this analysis  is as follows  (millions  of Rupiah):  180 (92/93);  180 (93/94);  and 250 (94/95).  Another  government  agency  (Parum  Jasa Tinta)  has also financed  a
number  of monitoring  activities.  Its budget  for 94/95  was 200  millions  rupiah.
4 Started  participation  in PROKASIH  in 94/95.
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Table 2: Number of PROKASIH Establishments per Cate  or
Category  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994
Dept. store  0  0  0  5  5
Hospital  0  0  22  34  42
Hotel  0  0  19  41  50
Industry  381  778  1008  1235  1275
Laundry  0  1  3  4  4
Supermarket  0  0  0  1  1
Warehouse  0  0  1  2  2
Workshop  0  2  5  26  26
TOTAL  381  781  1057  1348  1405
Table 3: Average Employment per PROKASIH Plant per Province (1994)
Province  Number of  Total number  Employment  Employment
PROKASIH  of plants'  per  per plant in
plant  PROKASIH  province
.______________  ______________  ______________  plant
Jawa Barat  723  4833  267  515
D.K.I. Jakarta  228  2289  517  254
Jawa Tengah  64  2915  905  156
Jawa Timur  45  4195  1729  182
Lampung  34  215  468  155
Sumatera  33  270  789  206
Selatan  _  _  _  _  _
Kalimantan  31  129  1296  437
Timur  _  _
Sumatera Utara  30  1058  613  187
Kalimantan  20  166  909  264
Selatan  _  _  _
Riau  19  223  1700  296
D.I. Aceh  17  97  446  153
D.I. Yogyakarta  16  250  549  122
Kalimantan  15  171  618  229
B  arat  _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  _ _ _  _ __35
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Table 4: Average Budget per PROKASIH  Plant  (1994)
Province  Number  of plants  Total budget  Average  budget  per
________________________  (millions of rupiah)  plart  (millions)
Jawa Barat  723  332  0.46
DKI Jakarta  228  375  1.64
Jawa Tengah  64  143  2.23
Jawa  Timur  45  285  6.33
Lampung  34  175  5.15
Sumatera  Selatan  33  135  4.10
Kalimantan  Timur  31  136  4.38
Sumatera  Utara  30  107  3.56
Kalimantan  Selatan  20  86  4.30
Riau  19  91  4.79
D.I. Aceh  17  82  4.82
D.I. Yogyakarta  16  189  11.81
Kalimantan  Barat  15  115  7.66
Figure 1: Coverage of PROKASIH Plants by KEPIMEN/03/1991  in 1994
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Table 5: Potential Errors in Sampling and Analysis
Designing  a sampling  strategy
*  Taking samples  at locations  or times that do not accurately  represent  the quality of
the effluent  being sampled.
Collecting  samples
*  Using  equipment  made of inappropriate  material  that may  react with samples  and
contaminate  them.
*  Using sampling  equipment  that is not decontaminated  between  sampling  episodes.
Handling,  preserving,  and transporting  samples
*  Improperly  refrigerating  or holding  for too long unstable  samples.
*  Using  improper  procedures  for transporting  samples  that may  result in mismarked  or
lost samples.
Preparing  and analyzing  samples  in the laboratory
*  Calibrating  instruments  improperly.
*  Using  incorrect  analytical  methods  to test samples.
Interpreting  data
*  Transposing  numbers.
*  Using  incorrect  formulas.
*  Misplacing  decimal  point.
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Information Collection by BAPEDAL
Figure  1: Information production and collection
l  BAPEDAL
Indicates  samrpling  and  analysis
- - - Indicates  flow  of  information
_  - - PROKASIH  - - - - - -
Team  s
|Plants  with  1/\  lants  without|





Upon agreeing  with BAPEDAL  on a target level of pollution,  it is understood  that plants will
periodically  measure  the pollution  concentration  of their effluents, and flow  rates (m 3 of water/day). tPlants
without laboratory facilities must have  their samples analysed by  independent laboratories or  by
PROKASIH-designated  laboratories;  plants with laboratory  facilities  can also use these independent  and
designated  laboratories.  PROKASIH  teams  collect information  from two  different  sources.  First,  they have
access to the data collected by the plants themselves  (whether  analysed  by independent,  designated  or
plants' laboratories).  This is in some sense similar  to a system  of self-reporting,  the difference  being that
PROKASIH  teams  must visit the plants and collect the information.  Second,  they can themselves  perform  a
sampling  and analysis  of the plant's effluents. The information  collected  from these two sources is then
transferred  to BAPEDAL.
Reduction  in the emissions of  total suspended  solids are also part of the agreement.
However,  at the current  moment,  only BOD data have been systematically  collected  and
computerized.
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